Designing secure and robust gr ouping-proof protocols based o n RFID characte ristics becomes a hotspot in the research of security in Internet of Things (IOT). The proposed grouping-proof protocol s recently have security and/or privacy omission and these schemes afford order-dependence by relaying message among tags through an RFID reader. In consequence, aiming at enhancing the robustness, improving scalability, reducing the computation costs on resource-constrained devices, and meanwhile combing Computational Intelligence (CI) with Secure Multiparty Communication (SMC), a Forward-Secure Grouping-Proof Protocol (FSGP) for multiple RFID tags based on Shamir's (n, n) secret sharing is proposed. In comparison with the previous grouping-proof protocols, FSGP has the characteristics of forward-security and order-independence addressing the scalability issue by avoiding relaying message. Our protocol prov ides security enhancement, performance improvement, and meanwhile controls the computation cost, which equilibrates both security and low cost requirements for RFID tags.
Introduction
With the wide spread of RFID tags and its chea p implementations, the need for providing secure and privacy-preserving authentication protocols in extremely resource-constrained environments is evident. Ari Juels first introduced yoking-proof 1 , which involves generating evidence of the simultaneous presence of two tags in the range of an RFID reader. The proof can then be verified by a verifier which holds all the secret keys of tags. Then he e xtended this notion and envisioned the concept of grouping-proofs [2] [3] [4] , which allows multiple RFID tags to provide evidence that they are scanned simultaneously in an i dentification session by one or more readers within its broadcast range. Other improved variants of yoking-proof were also proposed in 3, 6, 7 . As Juels 1 already pointed out, t here are several practical scenarios where grouping-proofs could significantly expand the capabilities of RFID-based systems, such as manufacturing, supply chains, access control, e-ticketing and counterfeit prevention, etc. Motivated by the potential applications, several grouping-proofs for RFID tags are developed in recent years RFID tags are severely constrained in terms of storage resources, computational capabilities and power supply, and therefore the protocols that involve high computational and storage burdens are not attractive. Computational intelligence (CI) has been successfully used in recent years to address various challenges such as data aggregation, security, optimal deployment and localization, which brings about broad applicability, flexibility, self o ptimization capability and robustness against malicious attacks in dynamic environments. CI is an area of fundam ental and a pplied research 9, 10 involving numerical information processing in con trast to the symbolic information processing techniques of artificial intelligence (AI), wh ich is defined as 11 the computational models and tools of in telligence capable of inputting raw nu merical sensory data directly, processing them by exploiting the representational parallelism and pipelining the problems, generating reliable and timely r esponses and w ithstanding high fault tolerance. CI stud ies adaptive mechanisms that enable or facilitate in telligent behavior in complex and changing environments 12, 13 , which encompasses neural networks, genetic algorithms, reinforcement learning, swarm intelligence, evolutionary algorithms, fuzzy logic and artificial immune systems, etc.
Different from the common techniques of CI that is addressed above, we focus on the applications of CI into this rapidly growing area of grouping-proof protocols for RFID tag s by combing CI with Secu re Multi-party Communication (SMC). In this paper we first evaluate these proposed grouping-proofs [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] recently to observe security demand and a nalyze security wea kness. Then we propose a lightweight forward-secure groupingproof protocol based on Shamir's (n, n) secret sharing to improve scalability, robustness, especially orderindependence by avoiding relaying message. In comparison with the previous grouping-proofs, our contributions can be summarized as follows: (i) Guarantees session unlinkability with forward security by aut o-update mechanism for secret and state information within a tag. (ii) Ensures the protocol order-independent by avoiding relaying message through RFID reader using Shamir's (n, n) secret sharing. (iii) Addresses the scalability issue which makes a single authentication protocol in combination with a grouping-proof protocol properly by controlling round-trip time of a ch allenge-response cycle and applying the technique of CI properly. (iv) Enhances the robustness, which makes the protocol thwart man-in-the-middle attack, replay attack, counterfeit attack in a formal security framework and meanwhile possess tag anonymity and untraceability. (v) Meets the requirement of lightweight on resourceconstrained devices by only using MAC and PRNG operation on RFID tags. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present a critical review of the related work i n Section 2. In Section 3 we then review some preliminaries briefly. Next o ur forward-secure grouping-proof protocol (FSGP) is described in Section 4. The Section 5 addre sses the presentation of sec urity and performance analysis. Finally, Section 6 concludes this paper.
Related Works: RFID Grouping-Proofs

Review of existing protocols
The idea of grouping proofs originated from 7 which are variants of timestamp-based yoking proof to avoid race conditions. In both schemes tag anonymity and forward security cannot be guaranteed and they cannot defend against DOP attack. Chien et al. 15 also proposed an offline grouping-proof protocol. Unfortunately it is vulnerable to replay attacks.
Common weakness of existing RFID Groupingproofs
In the previous section, we show the analysis to recent schemes [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Then we summarize the common weakness of those schemes as follows.
(1) Afford order-dependence by relaying message among tags transferring through an RFID reader. (2) Reduce the efficiency, improve failure rates a nd especially reject verification in one proof session. (3) Suffer from the weak scalability issue which isolates a single authentication from a grouping-proof.
(4) Address weak secure and p rivacy properties, which sometimes cannot defend against malicious attacks and do not have unlinkability.
Preliminary
RFID Deployments and Assumption
6
A typical deployment of an RFID system involves three types of legitimate entities: Tags, Readers and a Verifier (or a Bac kend Server). Throughout this paper, we assume the following characteristic of grouping-proof: (1) The tags are passive and have very limited computation and communication capabilities. It is common assumed that they are able to pe rform basic cryptographic operations such as ge nerating pseudorandom numbers and evaluating pseudo-random functions. The tags do not maintain clocks while the verifier controls a challenge-response cycle. (2) The readers establish communication channels that link the tags to manage the interrogation of tags and keep a record of proofs for each session which cannot be manipulated by the adversary. (3) The verifier is th e only trusted entity that may share some secret information with the tags s uch as cryptographic keys. The verifier has a secure channel that links to the readers. In contrast, t he channels between tags and the reader are considered insecure. (4) A qualified RFID grouping-proof protocol should comply with several essential security and privacy requirements 16 , such as data confidentiality, tag anonymity, forward security, defending against malicious attacks and untraceability. (5) RFID grouping-proof protocols are mainly concerned with security issues 16 at the protocol layer and not with physical or link layer issues.
Shamir's (t, n)-SS
17
Secret sharing schemes were o riginally introduced by Blakley 18 and Shamir 19 independently as a so lution for 
Our Protocol FSGP
To enhance the robustness, reduce the computation costs and avoid order-dependent, we propose a forwardsecure grouping-proof protocol for multiple RFID tag s based on Shamir's (n, n)-SS, which is the new application of co mbing CI with SMC to construct Grouping-proof protocol. FSGP addresses the scalability issue properly by avoiding relaying message among tags through RFID reader and realizes the direct challenge-response among readers and tags. Moreover the protocol guarantees session unlinkability by adding forward security. Our protocol FSGP sets a si ngle authentication proof being a typical e xample of a grouping-proof properly in one c hallenge-response session by applying the technique of CI properly. In addition, FSGP is ligh tweight by reducing the computation costs on resource-constrained devices because tags operations are limited to the invocation of a PRNG function and MAC operation.
Notations
We use the notations base on Juel 1 for entities and operations as su mmarized in Table 1 to simplify description.
Forward-Secure Grouping-Proof (FSGP)
In the following, we will construct FSGP based on Shamir's (n, n)-SS, which can rec over the ori ginal secret x by collecting n legitimate (or not forging) subsecret. Our protocol controls a challenge-response session cycle by tim estamp TS and △ T. FSGP is invalid when the time of challenge-response exceeds one session cycle. The procedure is described as follows: 
3, in which all coefficients a 0 , a 1 , …,a n-1 ∈GF(p). V sets x=a 0 = f(0) and keeps f(x) secret. (2) V→R: V generates n couples of sub-random-number (x i , y i ) by f(x) and sends them to R (i=1, 2,…, n). V stores TS and x of this grouping-proof session in K and those haven't been attacked into H, but others are viewed as suspicious tags and are put into S. T hen T i in S will proceed with t he same to (1) of Legitimacy Authentication Phase.
The generation process of FSGP is shown in Fig.1 . The outputs of FSGP are the legitimate T i in H and the suspicious T i in S.
Evaluation
In this section, we present the security and performance analysis of our protocol FSGP. In addition, we compare FSGP with previous research works based on the typical characteristics of the existing grouping-proof protocols.
Security analysis
(1) Tag Anonymity: Instead of transmitting static tag T i identity in plaintext over R-T insecure communication channel, FSGP utilizes a dynam ically generated random number x i by using PRNG and a constructed polynomial f(x) in ( n, n)-SS to challenge each tag T i directly during one session to achieve ta g anonymity.
The response of T i is the triples ) , , ( x over the insecure wireless channel can be eavesdropped, it is im possible to obtain the relevant information about ID i of the legitimate tag T i . The security robustness of ID i embedded in transm itted messages x i will not be compromised. Hence, tag anonymity can be guaranteed in our scheme. (2) Untraceability: On concern of t he privacy, FSGP randomizes the direct challenge-response among readers and tags in one session. Since FSGP offers privacy protection against an adversary, the transmitted message over R-T channel and the current state val ue j i s of T i depend on the dynamically generated random number x i which is ra ndomized in different proof sessions. Moreover V changes every Timestamp TS after a successful verification, which adds the difficulties for an attacker to trace ta gs. On account of t he triples ) , , ( 
has the c haracteristic of random and peri odic and the a dversary cannot obtain ) , , , (
is equivalent to attacking PRNG. Therefore, even if T i was compromised in period j, the grouping-proof before period j is valid. Hence, the evol utions of In order to obtain valid message of tags in a successful session, an a dversary tries to int erpolate the transmitted message over R-T channel and interfere in the challenge-response but V-R-T cannot detect.
Case① Supposing that an adversary eavesdrops one or more challenges x i during the challenge phase and interpolates it into x' i . To this case, MITM attack is described as follows: (I) If the adversary sends x' i to legiti mate T i , the response of Based on the analysis of Case①②, the interference of FSGP will not be successful. Furthermore, even if the adversary eavesdrops all of n challenge x i of this current session, he cannot be able to reconstruct the m ainrandom-number x of t his current session without knowing y i . Hence, FSGP are immune to MITM attack. (6) Resistance to Counterfeit Attack: To defend against counterfeit attack, FSGP utilize a tim eout mechanism to ensure that all the pr oof-involved tags coexist at a specific and lim ited time period. V will not accept the response which is forged or reaches out of TS in the current session. The detailed analysis is described as follows:
Case① 
, this difficulty is also equivalent to attacking MAC 1 . Therefore, T i Impersonation Resistance will not succeed.
Moreover, FSGP can defend against illegiti mate T i of malicious counterfeit which is activated by a malicious R' because T i is out of the broadcast range of the readers. The detailed analysis process is similar to the above T i Impersonation Resistance and (5) Case①. Therefore this kind of malicious attack cannot succeed.
Case② R Impersonation Resistance: An a dversary tries to i mpersonate a leg itimate R in this session and transmits the challenge-response over V-T by the forged R. Because the transmitted challenge-response over V-T communication channel are not relevant to ID i of legitimate T i and moreover j i s is generated by PRNG and updated according to the different sessions, the forged R cannot obtain any information about the privacy of T i . If the forged R tr ies to eav esdrop and modify the tr ansmitted challenge-response over V-T, the grouping-proof will not be allowed, that means that attacking to R Impersonation cannot succeed. The detailed process refers to the analysis of (5).
Hence, FSGP can resist both T i and R impersonation attack and has the property of strong unforgeability.
Performance analysis
Since RFID tags are generally low cost with ext remely limited resources, it is nece ssary for tags to achieve authentication by using t he lightweight primitives. According to the requirement of resource-constrained devices, in our grouping-proof FSGP, only simple control commands and th ree primitive arithmetic operations are required, such as Lagrange interpolating polynomial f(x) construction, random number generator PRNG() and minimalist keyed m essage authentication code MAC[] of sub-random-number. Moreover, we put the construction operation of f(x) over Verifier and the operations of PRNG and M AC are re quired at the tag end. Based on the research results in [1] [2] [3] [4] and E PC standard specification 21 , it is proved that these computation costs can be afforded by resourceconstrained tags. Hence, we think t hat FSGP is ve ry competitive to be a solu tion candidate on forwardsecure grouping-proof for RFID tags.
Security comparison
In the following, we compare FSGP with previous related works in terms of security and privacy aspects in Tables 2, which shows that security robustness of our protocol is s uperior to the others by supporting tag anonymity, untraceability, forward security, a nd resisting to security threats such as replay attack, MITM attack and counterfeit attack. In summary, based on the above analysis and security comparison, our protocol FSGP has the characteristics of forward-security, robustness, order- 
Conclusion
To overcome the weakness of security and/or privacy omission and order-dependence in the previous grouping-proof protocols, in this paper we develop a grouping-proof protocol with forward security for multiple RFID tags based on Shamir's (n, n) secret sharing, called FSGP, which solves the scalability issue properly by avoiding relaying message among tags through RFID reader and meanwhile achieves security enhancement and robust privacy protection. FSGP can defend against malicious attacks a nd possess excellent privacy properties and also realizes a single authentication protocol in combination with a groupingproof protocol properly by the application of CI. In terms of pr otocol performance measurement, our protocol is lightweight which meets the requirement of resource-constrained RFID tags without increasing much computing burden at both tag end and server end. In the future, as com plexity of technol ogy and networks' services incr ease new challenging m ulticombinatorial problems are emerging and consequently the CI applications are apt to further enhancement in the environment of Internet of things.
